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SLS Test Stand Site Selection 
 
 Finding a Field for Green Running  
Test site selection is a critical element of the 
design, development and production of a new system. 
With the advent of the new Space Launch System 
(SLS), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) had a number of test site 
selection decisions that needed to be made early 
enough in the Program to support the planned Launch 
Readiness Date (LRD).  
This case study focuses on decisions that needed 
to be made in 2011 and 2012 in preparation for the 
April 2013 DPMC decision about where to execute 
the Main Propulsion Test that is commonly referred to 
as “Green Run.” Those decisions relied upon 
cooperative analysis between the Program, the Test 
Lab and Center Operations.  
The SLS is a human spaceflight vehicle 
designed to carry a crew farther into space than 
humans have previously flown. The vehicle consists of four parts: the crew capsule, the upper 
stage, the core stage, and the first stage solid rocket boosters. The crew capsule carries the 
astronauts, while the upper stage, the core stage, and solid rocket boosters provide thrust for the 
vehicle. In other words, the stages provide the “lift” part of the lift vehicle. In conjunction with 
the solid rocket boosters, the core stage provides the initial “get-off-the-ground” thrust to the 
Figure 1 SLS Vehicle (Block 1) by Elements (NASA) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160005658 2019-08-31T03:30:22+00:00Z
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vehicle.  The ignition of the four core stage engines and two solid rocket boosters is the first step 
in the launch portion of the mission. The solid rocket boosters burn out after about 2 minutes of 
flight, and are then jettisoned.  The core stage provides thrust until the vehicle reaches a specific 
altitude and speed, at which point the core stage is shut off and jettisoned, and the upper stage 
provides vehicle thrust for subsequent mission trajectories.   
The integrated core stage primarily consists of a liquid oxygen tank, a liquid hydrogen tank, 
and the four core stage engines. For the SLS program, four RS-25 engines were selected as the 
four core stage engines. The RS-25 engine is the same engine that was used for Space Shuttle.  
The test plan for the integrated core stage was broken down into several segments: 
Component testing, system level testing, and element level testing. In this context, components 
are items such as valves, controllers, sensors, etc. Systems are items such as an entire engine, a 
tank, or the outer stage body. The core stage itself is considered to be an element. The rocket 
engines are also considered an element.  At the program level, it was decided to perform a single 
green run test on the integrated core stage prior to shipment of it to Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) for use in the EM-1 test flight of the SLS vehicle. A green run test is the first live fire of 
the new integrated core stage and engine elements – without boosters of course.  
The SLS Program had to decide where to perform SLS green run testing. 
 
Propulsion Testing at NASA 
Historically, NASA’s larger rocket and motor program infrastructure support has been 
generational. For example, the Apollo program spanned from the 1950s to the 1970s, with 
infrastructure development at Marshall mainly in the 1960’s. Marshall’s infrastructure was 
modified to also support the Shuttle program. Infrastructure work at Stennis Space Center (SSC) 
began in 1961 when it was known as the Mississippi Test Facility. The site was also named the 
Mississippi Test Operations and the National Space Technology Laboratories until 1988 when it 
was renamed for Mississippi senator and space program supporter John C. Stennis.  
The test stands at SSC supported the Apollo/Saturn, and Shuttle programs. Much of the 
infrastructure needed to test Shuttle propulsion was designed and developed in the early years of 
the Shuttle program in the 1970s. During the early Shuttle period, the Agency had very limited 
data processing capabilities and learned much about applied physics relating to large rockets 
from the first Shuttle launch. Shuttle testing and development continued from the 1970s to the 
early 2000s, first at Marshall and then at Stennis.  Shuttle propulsion testing was moved to 
Stennis around 1996.  The Agency started to significantly reduce the quantity and expense of test 
support facilities to control costs as the Shuttle program drew to a close. 
In interim years, between programs, maintenance of test facilities fell mostly upon Center 
Maintenance and Operations (CM&O) funding since program testing was complete. Starting 
around 2004, the Agency began to make a number of strategic decisions to help reduce the 
CM&O infrastructure cost after Shuttle. These decisions impacted the Solid Rocket Booster 
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(SRB) facilities and many others across MSFC, Santa Susanna Field Laboratory, and contractor 
facilities.  
SLS facility decisions were made with insight from experience gained through support of the 
Constellation Program and the Ares project. The initial baseline for SLS was that the same tests 
envisioned for Constellation would be needed, since the rocket and missions were similar. SLS 
considered using the MSFC stand for main propulsion testing.  
 
Running the Options  
Once the number of hot-fires for the integrated core stage had been selected, the next step in 
the process was to select a test site. The decision process involved examination of several 
factors: 
1. The enveloping characteristics of the integrated core stage, which encompasses core 
stage characteristics such as length, diameter, weight, static loads, and dynamic load 
interface locations, etc.  
2. Loads: The overall loading applied by the integrated core stage to the test facility by 
weight, thrust generated, and thermal interactions 
3. Resource capabilities: Evaluation of the test facilities ability to supply propellants, 
purges, water, and power to the core stage during the hot-fire testing 
4. Personal and group access plus coordinated use by various people from program and 
support areas 
5. Environmental impacts related to conducting the core stage test fire 
6. Center Missions 
7. Political impacts 
8. Costs 
9. Schedule availability 
10. Risk 
11. Transportation and ground support requirements 
12. Infrastructure impacts 
 
Very early in the decision process, the decision team discovered that there were only three 
facilities in the U.S. that had the potential to meet the needs of the core stage testing program:  
The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Test Facility L 1-125 1C located at Edwards AFB (not 
shown), the Saturn V Test Stand located at MSFC, and the B-Complex Test Stands located at 
SSC shown in Figures 2 and 3. The next step taken by the decision team was to determine what 
modifications would have to be made at each location in order to bring the specific facility 
capabilities into alignment with the core stage testing program needs. In this arena, each site was 
facing a different set of obstacles.  
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Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)  
AFRL was operating in an inactive standby mode. Initially, AFRL could not support the SLS 
schedule. But with additional discussion, it was concluded that schedule requirements could be 
supported. Parties agreed that, following standard AACE (Association for the Advancement of 
Cost Engineering, now AACE International) practices for the initial Rough Order of Magnitude 
(ROM) that was prepared to bring the facility up to par with program expectations, an adjustment 
range of 35 percent to 70 percent uncertainty was within the realm of possibility.  
It was also felt that the SLS design was in a fairly young stage and reliance on previous 
positions of Constellation and Ares would be beneficial. There were significant transportation 
challenges to move the core to AFRL for testing. Initial estimates included 5 days of ground 
transportation from the port to AFRL, but a transportation risk assessment was not completed.  
 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
At MSFC, it had been more than a decade since the MSFC propulsion test team had 
performed a full scale engine test, and several decades since the last full scale stage test, which 
was the Saturn V first stage, as shown in Figure 1. The MSFC stand was listed as “mothballed” 
and needed more than just mechanical modifications. Many years of minimized maintenance and 
upkeep meant that restoration of the facilities to baseline operable conditions was required. In 
fact, at the end of the Ares project, the entire West Test Area at MSFC had been mothballed, 
eliminating even preventative maintenance on it. Adding to the cost uncertainty, MSFC staff 
ceilings and attrition threatened the Center’s ability to provide full-time equivalent (FTE) civil 
service labor support. 
In addition, performing the test at MSFC created logistical obstacles as the SLS program had 
created a Concept of Operations that required the RS25 engines as individual units to be 
assembled and tested at SSC in Mississippi, near Slidell, Louisiana; and the fabrication, 
assembly, stage-to-engine integration to be performed at Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in 
New Orleans, Louisiana. The core stage test tests the entire assembly of engines and propellant 
tanks in one test.  This would mean that the operational portion of the cost estimate for the SLS 
core stage hotfire test would have to include the cost to transport the core stage by barge from 
MAF to the MSFC dock located on the Tennessee River.  
Acoustical noise would impact new housing areas and schools closer to MSFC. The program 
analyzed the acoustical impacts, which indicated that the sound of rocket testing off the test site 
would affect nearby residents, rattling of windows and possibly other impacts. This would 
increase the number of damage claims due to population increase and urban encroachment.  
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Stennis Space Center (SSC) 
At SSC, the test stand status was “mothballed/ abandoned.” Previous static firings of first 
stages were conducted in the B-2 test position “B” Dual Position Test Stand for acceptance 
testing from early spring 1967 through early fall 1970. Fifteen S-IC static firings were conducted 
for a duration of about 1875 seconds. Testing at the B-2 for the Delta Common Booster Core 
Program was completed in FY2001.  
To meet current program requirements, there were upgrades and repairs expected with the 
Booster Support Frame itself, various platform designated numbered levels (11, 8, and 7) 
characterized as both static and dynamic, the Aspirator and Flame Deflector. Test stand changes 
were anticipated for structural considerations relating to physically handling and maneuvering 
the core, structural support, and expected thrust. The Rocket Propulsion Test Program Office 
resides at SSC, and SSC is a short distance by barge from Michoud Assembly Facility where the 
SLS Core stage is assembled.  
The independent cost estimate noted that 6 months of schedule margin for this magnitude of 
a project was tough and needed to be managed closely. The cost estimate grew through assessing 
various risk scenarios. Despite the unique challenges faced by each center, according to the 
Exploration Systems Development (ESD) B-2 Assessment, the cost estimates for performing the 
SLS core stage hotfire test at SSC was based upon a 2-year period of study. This was far longer 
than the time spent developing the other potential site cost estimates. 
Early in the evaluation, the estimates were considered approximately the same at both MFSC 
and SSC. Additional project definition and refinement separated the cost estimates by about $100 
million, with SSC being higher.  
Figure 2 MSFC Saturn V Test Stand with 
Saturn V First Stage being lifted into place  
Figure 3 SSC B-Complex Test Facilities with 
propellant delivery barge in foreground 
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Another consideration for site selection was the Agency Level 0 strategic goals for capability 
alignment and maintenance cost reduction. For propulsion purposes, this task fell under the 
purview of the Rocket Propulsion Test Management Board (RPTMB), which managed the 
propulsion testing capabilities for the entire Agency. The RPTMB directed the use of the 
available facilities.  The Agency made a strategic decision that SSC would be the NASA center 
for technical excellence in hot-fire propulsion testing.  
The SLS program’s assessment is based on cost, schedule, and risk impacts to the program as 
well as the maturity of the data provided.  Another aspect of the decision assessment considered 
NASA’s strategic decisions to align capabilities across the Centers and not duplicate costly 
facilities.  Chart 1 shows the cost comparison for the three options as of April 2012.  Since the 
test stand estimate costs where not known due the immaturity of the design, all the lower factors 
are shown as the same for each program.  The uncertainty in the given estimates was very high, 
due to maturity of the SLS Program producing many unknowns.  
 
 
• Are there other evaluation factors that should be considered? 
 
• What factors are most important to you as the Program representative? 
The Test Lab representative? The Center Ops representative? 
 
• Do you weight initial cost advantages of MSFC over SSC or logistics and 
strategic Agency level institutional alignment for selection of Core Stage 
green run testing? 
 
• What site would you select?  
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